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COMMENTS
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL PRIOR TO TRIAL IN STATE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION

In Gideon v. Wainwright,' the Supreme Court has finally secured
the unqualified right to be represented by counsel at trial to the indigent
defendant in state criminal proceedings. 2 The long road to this decision
has not been smooth. The right to counsel in state criminal proceedings
made its first major appearance in the landmark case of Powell v.
Alabama.' Although a cursory examination of Powell leads to the conclusion that the right in capital cases was somewhat limited, 4 the Court
1. 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963).
2. Ibid. Gideon was charged with having broken and entered a poolroom with the
intent to commit a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under Florida law. He appeared
in court and asked to have counsel appointed for him, a request which was denied. Gideon
proceeded to conduct his own defense and did so "about as well as could be expected from a
layman." Id. at 792-93. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and Gideon was sentenced
to five years in the state prison.
The Court considered the facts in Betts v. Brady as "strikingly like the facts upon' which
Gideon here bases his federal constitutional claim." Id. at 793. In view of the similarities
the Court was confronted with the question whether Betts should be overruled.
The Court decided that the Betts opinion "was wrong . . . in concluding that the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of Counsel is not one of these fundamental rights. . . . The right
of one -charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to
fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours." Id. at 795-96. In conclusion the Court stated
that "Betts was 'an anachronism when handed down' and . . . it should now be overruled."
Id. at 797.
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion considered Betts "entitled to a more respectful
burial than has been accorded. . . ." Id. at 799. He pointed out that "the 'special circumstances' rule has continued to exist in form while its substance has been substantially and
steadily eroded. . . . The Court has come to recognize, in other words, that the mere
existence of a serious criminal charge constituted in itself special circumstances requiring
the services of counsel at trial." Id. at 800. He continued to state that "whether the rule
should extend to all criminal cases need not now be decided." Id. at 801.
Justice Harlan concluded by clarifying his position as distinguished from the majority
of the Court. He recognized the right to counsel as a fundamental right. However, he did not
agree that "we automatically carry over an entire body of federal law and apply it in full
sweep to the States ....
In what is done today I do not understand the Court . . . to embrace the concept that the Fourteenth Amendment 'incorporates' the Sixth Amendment as
such." Id. at 801.
Mr. Justice Clark, concurring in the result, pointed out that the results of the right to
counsel decisions had rested upon the capital-noncapital distinction. He expressed the view
that "the Court's decision today, then, does no more than erase a distinction which has
no basis in logic and an increasingly eroded basis in authority." Id. at 799.
3. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4. "All that is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case, where
the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own
defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the
court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due
process of law.. . ." Id. at 71.
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chose to make that right absolute in subsequent capital cases.' However, in Betts v. Brady,' a noncapital case, the Court decided that the
right to have counsel appointed at trial was subject to a highly flexible
standard. This standard demanded that the right was to be determined
by an appraisal of the facts in deciding whether the denial of appointed
counsel amounted to a lack of "fundamental fairness, shocking to the
universal sense of justice . . . ." In noncapital cases subsequent to
Betts, the Court did not choose to make that accused's right to counsel
absolute as it had done in capital cases subsequent to Powell," thereby
creating a distinction between the right to counsel in capital and noncapital cases. This distinction had been criticized so vehemently over
the past twenty years9 that the Court in Gideon overruled its decision
in Betts, and eliminated the flexible standard employed in that case for
determining the indigent's right to counsel at his trial in noncapital
10
cases.
In view of the Court's decision to do away with the capital-noncapital distinction at the trial level, this comment will concern itself
with an accused's constitutional right to be represented by counsel at
the pre-trial stages of state criminal proceedings. As Justice Black
stated in In Re Groban," "the right to use counsel at the formal trial
is a very hollow thing when, for all practical purposes, the conviction
is already assured by pretrial examination."' 2
I.

POLICE INTERROGATION AFTER ARREST

Apparently even the right to retain counsel does not accrue during
the interrogation period after arrest. The Supreme Court has twice considered the right to retain counsel at this early stage. In Crooker v.
California,3 the accused, a thirty-one-year-old college graduate who had
completed one year of law school, was arrested for murder. After three
successive interrogation periods he confessed. He had requested at
5. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663
(1947); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945) ; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
6. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
7. Id. at 462.
8. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) ; Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957);
Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951); Gibbs v.
Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Marino v. Ragan, 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
9. "Twenty years' experience in the state and federal courts with the Betts v. Brady
rule has demonstrated its basic failure as a constitutional guide. Indeed, it has served not
to guide but to confuse the courts as to when a person prosecuted by a State for crime is
entitled to a lawyer." Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 518 (1962) (Black, J., concurring.)
See also Beaney, Right to Counsel Bejore Arraignment, 45 Mius. L. REv. 771 (1961);

Rackow, The Right to Counsel--Time jor Recognition Under the Due Process Clause, 10
W. Ras. L. REv. 216 (1959).
10. See note 2 supra.
11. 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
12. Id. at 344. (Dissenting opinion.)

13. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
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least twice to call a named attorney, but to no avail. The Court considered this denial of retained counsel at the interrogation period in
conjunction with the subsequent trial and concluded that the accused
had received "that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept
of justice."'" Again, in Cicenia v. Lagay, 5 police authorities refused to
allow an attorney, retained by the accused on the evening before he
appeared at police headquarters, to confer with his client until after
the interrogation period. The Court reached a conclusion consistent
with Crooker, utilizing the same concept of fundamental fairness it had
stated therein.
However, a different result apparently will occur if the interrogation
is held after indictment. In Spano v. New York 6 the accused was
arrested after indictment. He was intensively questioned in the period
following his surrender. A confession was induced by an old friend
who was a member of the police department upon the assertion that
the officer would be in trouble with his superiors if the accused did
not confess. The accused's request for his attorney was denied. The
Court unanimously reversed the conviction, but disagreed as to the
reasons for reversal. Five of the justices reversed because they found
the confession inadmissible due to the circumstances under which it
was produced. Four justices, however, reversed on the denial of access
to retained counsel after indictment. In view of the position taken
by Justice Warren 1 7 in Crooker and Cicenia,8 apparently a majority of
the Court would hold that after indictment it is a denial of due process
to refuse a request to retain counsel.
The rationale behind the refusal of counsel during the interrogation
period is perhaps best expressed by Justice Jackson in his concurring
opinion in Watts v. Indiana:'
To bring in a lawyer means a real peril to solution of the crime,
because, under our adversary system, he deems that his sole
duty is to protect his client-guilty or innocent-and that in
such a capacity he owes no duty whatever to help society solve
its crime problem. Under this conception of criminal procedure,
any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain
terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances. 20
True, society has a great interest in solving its crime problem, but due
process demands a favorable balance between society's interest and the
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 439.
357 U.S. 504 (1958).
360 U.S. 315 (1959).
Justice Warren was with the majority in Spano.
Justice Warren was with the dissenters in Crooker and Cicenia.
338 U.S. 49 (1949).
Id. at 59.
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accused's individual rights. If due process provides the accused with
certain rights, why should a policy be adopted which would not facilitate the defendant's awareness of those rights? Justice Jackson apparently recognized the accused's right "to make no statement to police
under any circumstances" during interrogation and also the probability
of his ignorance of that right, yet he advocates a policy which would
encourage that ignorance.
"Under our adversary system" why should the state be given a
"head start" in the search for the solution of a particular crime? The
state is represented by skilled investigators, whereas the accused is
forced to stand alone at least until the interrogation period has ended.
[T]he layman needs protection from the complexities of the
legal system under which he lives. The defendant may be
ignorant of the rights that are granted to him by the legal
system, and he therefore needs the guidance of one who is
trained in the law to guard against the involuntary waiver
of such rights."'
It is submitted that more often than not it is vital for the accused
to be represented by counsel immediately upon arrest, at least to guard
against the extraction of a coerced confession. Even though the law
provides that a "coerced confession" is inadmissible as evidence and
numerous defendants have been successful in proving coercion, this
author wonders how many were unable to establish the involuntary
nature of their "confession." The latter reasoning evidently prompted
the dissenters in Crooker and Cicenia to declare that "the demands of
our civilization expressed in the Due Process Clause require that the
accused who wants a counsel should have one at any time after the
moment of arrest. 2 2
II.

WHEN DoES THE RIGHT ACCRUE?

A. Retained Counsel
It appears that a trend is directed toward recognizing demands that
the accused be represented by counsel at an early stage of the pre-trial
proceedings in order to afford some protection to his rights and facilitate an adequate presentation of his defense. There are numerous
reasons why this trend is developing. In addition to securing any
possible procedural advantage at this early stage, an attorney can assist
in explaining the charge to the accused. He can also start immediate
investigation, thereby preserving valuable evidence, and perhaps most
important, obtain and question witnesses at a time when the particular
21. Rackow, The Right to Counsel-Time for Recognition Under the Due Process
Clause, 10 W. REs. L. REV. 216, 226 (1959).
22. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 448 (1958). (Dissenting opinion.)
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event is fresh in their minds. All this should be done as soon as possible
if it is to be effective.2
[T]he time when an accused person really needs the help of a
lawyer is when he is first arrested and from then on until trial.
The intervening period is so full of hazards for the accused
person that he may have lost any legitimate defense, long
before he is arraigned and put on trial.24
Most states have provided for advising the accused of his right
to retain counsel at the preliminary hearing.2 5 However, some states
have, in the absence of statute, denied the accused the right to retain
counsel at that hearing.2 6
The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to ascertain whether
there is probable cause for believing the accused was the perpetrator
of the crime, "so that he may not in the meantime be unlawfully deprived
of his liberty. '27 The burden of proof rests on the state to show probable
cause. This is established by the introduction of evidence which is
subject to challenge by the accused through cross examination, impeachment of prosecution witnesses, objection to hearsay evidence, and
objection to illegally obtained evidence. The necessity for an attorney
to assist the accused at this hearing is obvious. What can the layman do
insofar as these procedural niceties are concerned?
B. Appointed Counsel
Apparently, in most jurisdictions, the accused can retain counsel at
his preliminary examination, if he can afford to. However, to the
indigent defendant, the right to retain counsel is certainly an illusory
one. Therefore, most states, either by case law or statute, provide that
the arraignment is the time when appointment of counsel should be
made for the indigent defendant.2" However, because some states
have no provisions or rules of this kind, the indigent's right to counsel
prior to trial must stem from the due process clause.
Apparently, there is no unqualified right of appointment at the
preliminary hearing. In State v. Sullivan2 9 the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit stated,
23. Special Comm. of the New York City Bar Ass'n, EQUAL JUSTICE EOR THE AccusED
(1959).
24. Miller, Lawyers and the Administration of Criminal Justice, 20 A.B.A.J. 77, 78
(1934).
25. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 902.01-03 (1961).
26. Blanks v. State, 30 Ala. App. 519, 8 So.2d 450 (1942); Hawk v. State, 151 Neb. 717,
39 N.W.2d 561 (1949).
27. Day v. State, 185 Ark. 710, 722, 49 S.W.2d 380, 384 (1932); 22 C.J.S. Criminal
Law § 331 (1961).
28. Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MnN. L. REv. 771, 776 (1961).
29. 227 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1955) cert. denied, 350 U.S. 973 (1956).
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the right guaranteed by the constitutional amendment does not
accrue until an indictment is returned or an information or
other like charge is lodged against the accused. . . The constitutional provision contains no express or implied command
that an accused shall be furnished counsel at the preliminary
hearing.30
An examination of the Supreme Court decisions indicates that the
"totality of circumstances" rule set forth in Betts, is apparently still
applicable to denial of counsel situations at the pre-trial stages. Many
cases in which the Court found "special circumstances" had actually
involved lack of counsel at the pre-trial stage." In Gibbs v. Burke 2
the Court stated,
a fair trial test necessitates an appraisal before and during the
trial of the facts of each case to determine whether the need
for counsel is so great that the deprivation of the right to
counsel works a fundamental unfairness. 3
In United States ex rel. Reid v. Richmond 4 the defendant, accused of
murder, was assigned counsel eleven weeks before trial. Prior to the
appointment of counsel, two confessions were extracted from him. The
Second Circuit upheld the conviction but noted that there is a duty to
appoint counsel to indigent defendants at some point prior to trial.
However, "the precise point during pretrial proceedings at which the
5
duty... arises is not set by any inflexible rule ....
Perhaps a less flexible standard was announced by the Supreme
Court in Hamilton v. Alabama.3 Hamilton, charged with a capital
offense, was arraigned after indictment without the benefit of counsel
and pleaded not guilty. He was assigned counsel prior to trial, found
guilty, and sentenced to death. In Alabama, the arraignment can be
extremely crucial if assertions are not timely made. The accused must
enter a plea to the indictment; the defense of insanity must be raised
or it is waived since it may not be raised on trial except in the Court's
discretion, and a failure of the court to accept a plea of insanity is not
reviewable on appeal; pleas in abatement must also be raised or they
will be deemed waived; and motions to quash based on systematic
exclusion of one race from the grand jury must be raised or they will be
deemed waived. In view of these complex requirements at arraignment,
the Court reversed the conviction, stating, "whatever may be the function
30. Id. at 513.
31. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951);
Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948) ; Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
32. 337 U.S. 773 (1949).
33. Id. at 781. (Emphasis added.)
34. 295 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 948 (1961).
35. Id. at 88.
36. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
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and importance of arraignment in other jurisdictions, . . . in Alabama
37

it is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding."

Hamilton does not enunciate an absolute right to counsel at the
arraignment. The whole rationale of the decision is that arraignment
under Alabama law is an extremely critical period. Indeed, implicit in
the decision is the notion that, when arraignment is not "critical," a
denial of counsel will not violate due process.3 8 Since this case involved
a denial of counsel after indictment, it is questionable whether this
"critical stage" standard will be applied to situations prior to indictment. The complex nature of arraignment in Alabama and the denial of
counsel there resulted in a conclusion that the defendant was denied due
process. It would appear that the rationale of Hamilton could at least extend to pre-indictment proceedings which in each particular instance
could be termed "critical." 3 9
Although the "critical stage" standard is perhaps a shade clearer
and easier to apply than the "totality of circumstances" test, there is
still some doubt as to its applicability in noncapital cases. Although
the Court has abolished the capital-noncapital distinction at the trial
stage,40 it is apparently still questionable whether the distinction will
be significant at the pre-trial stages. The Court in Hamilton did note
the capital nature of the offense; 41 however, the crux of the decision
was the intricacy of the arraignment. Certainly, the arraignment in
Alabama is just as "critical" in a noncapital case as it is in a capital
case.
It is submitted that Court should clearly abolish the capitalnoncapital distinction at the pre-trial stage as it has finally done at the
trial level. It is difficult to support logically the distinction between pretrial capital and noncapital proceedings. Indeed, the distinction is worthless in view of the inability of laymen to understand the simplest points
of law and the "simplicity of the legal issues in many capital crimes
'42
as compared with the often difficult issues of noncapital offenses.
Why this distinction was ever resorted to initially is not clear. In no
37. Id. at 54.
38. People v. Terry, 57 Cal. 2d 538, 370 P.2d 985 (1962); White v. State, 227 Md. 615,
177 A.2d 877 (1962); People v. Lupo, 16 App. Div. 2d 943, 229 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1962).
39. Apparently the Court would employ the "critical stage" test prior to indictment.
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955) involved a Georgia statute which required that an
objection to a grand jury was to be made before the indictment was returned. The defendant
contended that he had been prejudiced because Negroes had been systematically excluded
from the grand jury which had indicted him on a charge of rape. Although counsel had
been appointed for him on the day after his indictment, the Court held that the appointment
at that time did not comply with the due process requirements.
40. Gideon v. Wainwright, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963).
41. "When one pleads to a capital charge without benefit of counsel, we do not stop
to determine whether prejudice resulted." 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
42. Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MINN. L. REV. 771, 778. (1961).
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other due process question decided by the Court has this distinction
appeared. Any criminal evidence seized illegally cannot be used in either
capital or noncapital cases.4" The right to trial by jury apparently is
applied equally in both capital and noncapital felonies,44 and furthermore, any unlawful methods employed by the state in obtaining a confession are equally condemned in both capital and noncapital cases.",
The fourteenth amendment itself makes no distinction between life and
liberty.4" Substantial pre-trial rights would seem just as necessary
in a prosecution which may result in loss of liberty as in one which
may result in loss of life itself. Indeed, some may put a greater value upon
liberty.
III. Is THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE THE ANSWER?

"The refusal to recognize the right of counsel in every criminal
case has
long seemed to me to be a denial of the equal protection of the
47

law.")

In Chandler v. Fretag," the right to retain counsel at trial was held
to be unqualified. The petitioner was indicted for housebreaking and
larceny. He was refused a continuance to enable him to obtain counsel
of his own choice. In holding that the petitioner had been denied due
process, the Court made it clear that the "totality of circumstances"
rule did not apply to one who could afford retained counsel. Until
Gideon v. Wainwright the result of the Court's decisions was to extend
an unqualified right to counsel to those who could afford it but, in
effect, to deny that right to the indigent. Although this result no longer

exists at the trial level, it does exist at the pre-trial stage.
As previously noted, most states allow for advising the accused
of his right to retain counsel at the preliminary hearing. Assume State X
has the following typical statute:
A defendant shall be brought without unreasonable delay
before a police justice upon arrest; the police justice must
immediately inform him of the charge against him, and of his
right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings.
Under the above statute a defendant has the unqualified right to retain
counsel at any of the pre-trial proceedings, beginning at least with the
preliminary hearing. However, to the indigent defendant the unqualified
43. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

44. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960).
45. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
46. "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law..... U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
47. Douglas, The Right to Counsel--A Foreword,45 Msi2. L. REv. 693 (1961).
48. 348 U.S. 3 (1954).

49. Gideon v. Wainwright, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963).
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right to retain counsel is a shallow right indeed. His poverty- clearly
places him in an inferior position to the defendant who can afford to
retain counsel. This result is apparently the basis of the inquiry as to
whether the indigent accused under these circumstances is denied the
equal protection of the laws.5 °
Whether the equal protection clause includes a safeguard against
a rich-poor distinction has not been ignored by the Court entirely.
Perhaps the strongest precedents for the application of the equal protection clause to the pre-trial right to counsel situation are the "transcript
cases." In Griffen v. Illinois," the Court was confronted with an Illinois
statute which gave every criminal defendant the right to take an appeal.
Illinois, however, required the appellant to furnish the appellate tribunal
with a transcript of the proceedings below before he could take an effective appeal. The Court concluded that an indigent defendant would
not be able to bear the cost of the transcript and thereby be denied an
effective appeal. Therefore, the Court held that to deny the indigent
defendant an effective appeal solely on the basis that he could not bear
the cost of a transcript was a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
The Court stated:
both equal protection and due process emphasize the central
aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with crime
must, so far as the law is concerned, "stand on an equality
before the bar of justice in every American court. . . ." In
criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account
of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color. Plainly
the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence and could not be used
as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial.52
3
This principle was affirmed by a unanimous Court in Smith v. Bennett1
where it was again held that the imposition of a financial barrier to
prevent the exercise of a right granted by the State violated the equal
protection clause.5"
The rationale of the "transcript cases" appears to be applicable
to the rich-poor distinction existing within the right to retain counsel.
The majority of states having granted an unqualified right to retain
counsel are not effectively providing an "equal" right to the indigent
50. "[N]or shall any State . . . deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-

tion of the laws." U.S. CoNsT., amend. XIV, § 1.
51. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
52. Id. at 17-18.
53. 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
54. "[Tlhe Fourteenth Amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor criminals in
equal scale, and its hand extends as far to each. In failing to extend the privilege of the
Great Writ to its indigent prisoners, Iowa denies them equal protection of the laws." Id.
at 714. See also Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
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defendant. Indeed, one state has recognized that an equal protection
violation exists in the pre-trial denial of counsel situation. In Wyatt
v. Wolf, 55 an Oklahoma court held that counsel must be appointed for
indigent defendants when they are brought before the magistrate upon
arrest. In construing the Oklahoma statutes 56 the court concluded:
the express provisions of the Constitution and the statutes and
the clear implication thereof . . . is that the accused must be

advised of his right to aid of counsel when brought before the
magistrate. If he desires aid of counsel and is unable because
of poverty to obtain counsel, it necessarily follows that the
magistrate should appoint counsel for him. .

.

. [T]he advice

in such cases, as to the right, is a vain and meaningless gesture
without affecting the provisions of the right. In other words,
how can we assert the right in one instance and deny it in
another? . . . Equal protection of the law, where indigent

defendants are involved, requires such procedure be invoked
in order
that the accused's substantial rights may be pro17
tected.

Perhaps the strongest argument against the application of the
equal protection clause to the pre-trial right to counsel question rests
in Justice Frankfurter's statement in Griffen that "a State need not
equalize economic conditions."5 " For if the equal protection clause
commands a state to provide the indigent defendant with counsel when
the right to retain counsel accrues, where is the line to be drawn?
Would not a state also be compelled to bear the indigent's cost to
employ expert witnesses; to subpoena both local and foreign witnesses;
to take depositions; and perhaps even to employ counsel of competence
"'equal" to the best available on retainer? The latter situations are
not so easily distinguishable from affording the right to counsel initially.
Perhaps these sweeping connotations will motivate the Court not to
apply the equal protection clause in this instance. However, the task
of distinguishing Griffen still remains.
Perhaps there is a slight "distinction." In the "transcript cases"
the inequality apparently resulted from a combination of two factorsthe poverty of the accused, and the active prerequisite of a money
payment imposed by and payable to the state. The element of "state
action" necessary in equal protection situations is clear and outstanding.
However, in the pre-trial right to counsel situation the necessary element
of "state action" is not quite as noticeable. The attorney's "fee" is
not imposed by the state nor is it payable to the state. This "distinction"
55. 324 P.2d 548 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
56. ORL4. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 251, 252 (1937).
57. Wyatt v. Wolf, 324 P.2d 548, 551 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
58. Griffen v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956). (Concurring opinion.)
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could be the basis for the conclusion that the essential element-state
action-is lacking.
It is submitted that the distinction is too slight upon which to
rest the denial of counsel. The effect is the same in both the "transcript
cases" and the denial of counsel cases-the defendant is denied a
right available to other members of his class solely because of his
poverty. It would appear that the equal protection clause at least
encompasses a requirement to provide the defendant with counsel at
the pre-trial stages.
CONCLUSION

It is unnecessary to reiterate all of the factors tending to show the
importance of pre-trial proceedings and the ultimate effect upon the
outcome of the trial. Let it suffice to state that perhaps the pre-trial stage
has proven to be a greater hazard to the defense interest than the trial itself. The need for counsel at this stage is indeed great. It is rather depressing to note the perhaps hypocritical position taken by the states
which refuse the assistance of counsel at the pre-trial stage. Every state
imposes, in the interest of the public welfare, stringent requirements upon
a person who intends to make the practice of law his profession. The
state, in this instance, recognizes the complexities in the law by requiring
the attorney to fulfill certain conditions before he is considered "competent" to practice within the particular jurisdiction. Yet, the accused who
cannot afford to retain counsel at the pre-trial stages is in effect told that
he is "competent" to practice law-at least as "competent" as the due
process clause requires him to be. He is perhaps no longer one of the
"general public" whose protection is assured by the requirements imposed
upon the attorney.
The writer is in full accord with Professor Beaney's statement that
this is an area where the judges must assume responsibility if
substantial changes are to occur ....

Such improvement is not

likely to result from a balancing of interests, with a finding
that the social and individual interest in full protection outweighs the social interest in convicting more defendants.
Rather, it will result from an awareness that the present "free
trial" rule as applied is illogical, and the logic of its application
becomes more obvious with each case.59
It took twenty-one years for the Court in Gideon to respond to
the criticism of Betts and provide an adequate solution to the right
of counsel problem at the trial level. It is hoped the pre-trial problem
will be solved within a more reasonable time.
MICHAEL J.

OSMAN

59. Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 Minz;. L. REv. 771, 779 (1961).

